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BETTING ON TORT SUITS AFTER THE EVENT:
FROM CHAMPERTY TO INSURANCE
Anthony J. Sebok*
INTRODUCTION
The common law today permits third parties unrelated to litigation
to provide material support to parties involved in litigation in ex-
change for something of value contingent on the outcome of the litiga-
tion.' This practice is called champerty, and it is a species of
maintenance, which is the support of litigation by a stranger.2 Al-
though once forbidden, champerty is now legal in the United King-
dom.3 In the United States, the permissibility of champerty varies
from state to state, with sixteen states permitting the practice explic-
itly and another twelve permitting it implicitly.4
Technically speaking, the bargain struck between two parties in
champerty is not an assignment. It is the partial assignment of the
proceeds of litigation in which the property interest of the funder is by
definition contingent on an uncertain event happening in the future-
that is, the positive resolution of a lawsuit by either judgment or set-
tlement. The "chose in action" remains in the hands of the original
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. I would like to thank Professor
Stephan Landsman for giving me the opportunity to present my views on litigation finance to the
Clifford Symposium, as well as Tom Baker, Mark Geistfeld, Myriam Gilles, John Goldberg,
Adam Scales, Cathy Sharkey, and Ben Zipursky for their comments.
1. For an analysis of the current law of champerty in the United States, see Anthony J. Sebok,
The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REv. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 54-69), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1593329. For a comparative analysis of the law of champerty in the U.S.,
the U.K., and Australia, see VICKI WAYE, TRADING IN LEGAL CLAIMs: LAW, POLICY AND Fu-
TUM DIRECTIONS IN AUSTRALIA, UK & US (2008).
2. See generally Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CALIF. L. RFv. 48 (1936).
3. In the U.K., third-party funding of litigation was unlawful until 1967. The Criminal Law
Act of 1967 § 14(1) abolished criminal and tortious liability for maintenance and champerty. See
Rachael Mulheron & Peter Cashman, Third-Party Funding of Litigation: A Changing Land-
scape, 27 Civ. JusT. Q. 312, 318 (2008). Section 14(2) provided, however, that such abolition
"shall not affect any rule of that law as to the cases in which a contract is to be treated as
contrary to public policy or otherwise illegal." Id. at 318-19.
4. See Sebok, supra note 1, (manuscript at 54). Some states, such as Connecticut and Colo-
rado, started permitting third-party investment in the early nineteenth century, while others,
such as Georgia, still prohibit it by statute. Id. (manuscript at 40, 60, 70).
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party who suffered the wrong upon which the lawsuit is based.5 Nor
does champerty have anything to do with lending, despite the confu-
sion of some courts on this point (and the careless use of the term
"non-recourse lending" by some litigation investment companies to
describe champerty). 6
There is a long tradition of hostility towards champerty in the com-
mon law. In Book IV of the Commentaries, in a discussion of wrongs
against the public, Blackstone denounced maintenance as "an offence
against public justice, as it keeps alive strife and contention, and per-
verts the remedial process of the law into an engine of oppression."7
Champerty was the most odious form of maintenance and was "a
practice so much abhorred by our law, that it is one main reason why a
chose in action, or thing of which one [has] the right but not the pos-
session, is not assignable at common law; because no man should
purchase any pretence to sue in another's right."8
In a recent article, I tried to reconstruct the Blackstonian response
because it lives on and has been repeated with some frequency by
modern courts and critics of champerty.9 In that article, I identified
three possible arguments for opposing champerty (as well as all forms
of maintenance and assignment): (1) the argument from history, (2)
the argument from corrective justice, and (3) the prudential argument.
The argument from history is that, because the prohibition on third-
party involvement in litigation has been part of the "Western legal
tradition" since Roman law, modern courts should assume that-bar-
ring compelling reasons to the contrary-the common law cannot ac-
commodate practices like champerty.' 0 This argument from history is
doubly flawed. First, it is not clear why history alone should dictate
the interpretation of the common law." Second, the historical story is
5. See W. S. Holdsworth, The History of the Treatment of Choses in Action by the Common
Law, 33 HAnv. L. RiEv. 997, 998 (1920).
6. See Lawsuit Fin., L.L.C. v. Curry, 683 N.W.2d 233, 239 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004); Echeverria v.
Estate of Lindner, No. 018666/2002, 2005 WL 1083704, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 2, 2005);
Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., No. 20523, 2001 WL 1339487, at *2-3 (Ohio Ct.
App. Oct. 31, 2001). In each of these cases, the court made the mistake of treating the champer-
tous contract as a loan. For a good discussion of why this conflation is in error, see Anglo-Dutch
Petroleum Int'l, Inc. v. Haskell, 193 S.W.3d 87, 101 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006).
7. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *135 (1902).
8. Id.
9. See Sebok, supra note 1, (manuscript at 72-77).
10. See, e.g., Stephen B. Presser, A Tale of Two Models: Third Party Litigation in Historical
and Ideological Perspective (Pub. Policy Roundtable on Third Party Fin. of Litig., Discussion
Paper, 2009) (on file with author).
11. As Justice Holmes said in The Path of the Law,
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in
the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid
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not as clear as some would have it; soon after Blackstone wrote his
comments, American courts were endorsing a liberal approach to the
very practices he condemned. 12
The argument from corrective justice is that since the obligation
created by a wrongdoing in private law must be satisfied by the
wrongdoer paying only the person she wronged, and only if the de-
mand for payment is not tainted by a third-party's aid or instigation,
almost all forms of maintenance and assignment are incompatible with
private law theory, properly conceived. While some corrective justice
theorists might be drawn to this argument, I offer an interpretation of
corrective justice (one heavily influenced by Benjamin Zipursky's re-
course theory) that is compatible with a robust market in litigation.13
Finally, the prudential argument is that the development of a mar-
ket in litigation-especially in champerty-will harm society either by
encouraging an increase in frivolous litigation or creating litigation in
general, whether frivolous or not. The prudential argument would be
the greatest threat to champerty if it were proven true. So far, efforts
to prove it have been unimpressive.14 The fear that a market in cham-
perty will result in lawsuits that are more likely to be frivolous than
otherwise goes back to Blackstone, who, as we saw above, worried
that third-party investors would turn lawsuits into "engines of oppres-
sion." 15 The fear seems far-fetched given that third-party investors
operate under the same constraints as self-financing plaintiffs or law-
yers who finance their clients' suits under the system of the contin-
gency fee.16 The fear that a market in champerty might increase the
total amount of non-frivolous litigation seems to be as unpersuasive as
down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the
past.
O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897).
12. "In the United States, the rejection of [Blackstone's rationale] came early. Courts quite
correctly declared that maintenance, which was taken to include champerty, was prohibited in
England because of the special situation there and had no real foundation in the United States."
Radin, supra note 2, at 68 (footnotes omitted).
13. See Sebok, supra note 1, (manuscript at 82-84).
14. See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FORt LiEGAL RLvoRM, SELLING LAwsurrS, BUYING
TROUIBU: THIRD PARTY LrrIGATION FUNDING IN THE UNITED STATES (2009); Paul H. Rubin,
Third Party Financing of Litigation (Sept. 25, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
www.law.northwestern.edu/searlecenter/uploads/Rubin-ThirdPartyFinancingLitigation.pdf. My
skepticism of studies that claim that litigation financing increases frivolous litigation parallels the
skepticism expressed in Steven Garber, Alternative Litigation Financing in the United States:
Issues, Knowns, and Unknowns 31 (RAND Institute for Civil Justice 2010).
15. Blackstone's fears have been picked up by some modern day critics. See, e.g., U.S. CIAM-
BER INSTITUTE1 FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note 14, at 5 (arguing that "[t]hird-party financing
particularly increases the volume of questionable claims"); Rubin, supra note 14.
16. See Andrew Hananel & David Staubitz, The Ethics of Law Loans in the Post-Rancman
Era, 17 GiEo. J. LEGAL ETHIcS 795, 811-12 (2004).
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the argument from history: as many scholars have pointed out, society
might benefit from more well-grounded lawsuits being filed.'7
In this Article, I will not refer back to the three arguments above. I
want to explore a fourth argument that I did not discuss in my previ-
ous article on third-party investment in litigation. The argument is
that third-party investment is bad (or ought to be looked upon with
skepticism by the courts) because it is a form of gambling. This argu-
ment has appeared in a few judicial opinions in the United States, and
it represents an interesting, albeit unpersuasive, line of attack. This
Article will consider the accuracy of the characterization of champerty
as a form of gambling (or speculation) and the force of the critique.
II. Is CHAMPERTY GAMBLING?
Some courts have held that champerty is illegal because it is specu-
lation that violates state law. What these courts mean by the word
"speculation" is not clear, but a typical usage can be found in a 2003
decision by the Ohio Supreme Court: "[A] lawsuit is not an invest-
ment vehicle. Speculating in lawsuits is prohibited by Ohio law. An
intermeddler is not permitted to gorge upon the fruits of litigation."' 8
Sometimes, courts have meant the word "speculation" as a synonym
for "harassing." 19 This is easily seen when one considers that the ear-
liest form of maintenance in the United States was the contingency
fee. Courts expressed a fear that the privileges inherent in the prose-
cution of a civil action-to demand that the other side sit for deposi-
tion, appear in courts, and retain (expensive) counsel-might lead
lawyers to take a portion of the lawsuits of others in exchange for
their services.20 For this reason, an Ohio court refused to permit the
assignment of a disputed parcel of land to an attorney who promised
that if he succeeded in winning back the land, he would return half of
the property back to the assignor:
17. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, On the Alienability of Legal Claims, 114 YAus L.J. 697
(2005); Peter Charles Choharis, A Comprehensive Market Strategy for Tort Reform, 12 YALE J.
ON RE;G. 435 (1995); Robert Cooter, Towards a Market in Unmatured Tort Claims, 75 VA. L.
REV. 383 (1989); Ari Dobner, Litigation for Sale, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1529,1568 (1995); Jonathan
T. Molot, A Market in Litigation Risk, 76 U. Cm. L. RiV. 367 (2009); Marc J. Shukaitis, A
Market in Personal Injury Tort Claims, 16 J. LEGAL S-ruci. 329, 330 (1987); see generally
Jonathan T. Molot, A Market Approach to Litigation Accuracy (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author).
18. Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 789 N.E.2d 217, 221 (Ohio 2003). This
decision was legislatively reversed in 2008. See Omo Rev. CODE ANN. § 1349.55 (West Supp.
2010) ("Requirements governing non-recourse civil litigation advance contracts.").
19. See, e.g., Odell v. Legal Bucks, L.L.C., 665 S.E.2d 767 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).
20. See, e.g., Reece v. Kyle, 49 Ohio St. 475, 483-85 (Ohio 1892).
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A prospect of obtaining a large amount of property as consideration
for professional services, and the risk of an inconsiderable bill of
cost, form a strong temptation to speculation in lawsuits. It may
induce men to purchase the right of instituting suits on trifling pre-
tenses, for the purpose of forcing defendants to injurious and ruin-
ous compromises as the most effectual means of purchasing peace. 21
Yet, the real fear here was not speculation qua gambling, but some-
thing else-that if a lawyer "owned" part of a lawsuit, he would invest
more of his time than a case merited for no other reason than to drive
a defendant into an unjust settlement. When it came to "lawyer
champerty," the real concern was not gambling. For example, when
confronted with a case of a contingent fee taken on behalf of an "out
of state indigent" with a genuine case who wanted to contest a will,
the Tennessee Supreme Court permitted the champerty despite noting
that
nothing is more pernicious to the security of the community, nor
anything more injurious to that character, for dignity, integrity, and
purity, so indispensable in members of the bar, than the indulgence
of a gambling spirit which would lead them, for contingent and pos-
sible advantage, to agitate society in the prosecution of doubtful,
pretended, or obsolete claims.22
More typical of the courts that have linked champerty and gambling
are a handful of recent decisions such as Echeverria v. Estate of Lind-
ner 2 3 Lingel v. Olbin,24 and Wilson v. Harris.25 The Echeverria court
held that a "non-recourse" loan between a commercial funder and a
litigant who had received money pending the resolution of his suit
under New York's "scaffold law" was either a loan (because liability
under New York's Labor Law § 240 is no-fault) or "legalized gam-
bling."2 6 The Lingel court noted that one of the reasons why third
parties ought to be barred from any form of investment in litigation-
whether champerty or assignment-was to prevent the introduction of
the "vice" of speculation into contracts concerning lawsuits. 27
Wilson is perhaps the most interesting of these modern cases be-
cause it is the only case in which the court used its state's legislative
prohibition on gambling to strike down a champerty contract. 2 8 While
21. Key v. Vattier, 1 Ohio 132, 146 (1823).
22. Moore v. Trs. of Campbell Acad., 17 Tenn. 115, 118 (9 Yer. 1836).
23. Echeverria v. Estate of Lindner, No.018666/2002, 2005 WL 1083704 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 2,
2005).
24. Lingel v. Olbin, 8 P.3d 1163 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000).
25. Wilson v. Harris, 688 So. 2d 265 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996).
26. Echeverria, 2005 WL 1083704, at *8.
27. Lingel, 8 P.3d at 1167.
28. See Wilson, 688 So. 2d at 268-70.
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the facts of the dispute may have uniquely slanted against the cham-
pertor, this case is significant because the effect of the holding was to
end litigation investment in Alabama. Wilson, the champertor, gave
Harris, a "family friend," $4,749 in exchange for 33% of a wrongful
death suit that was under appeal. 29 The jury awarded Harris $4 mil-
lion. 30 The court probably could have found alternative grounds to
void the contract, but instead reached into Alabama's prohibition on
wagering:
Section 8-1-150, Ala. Code 1975, provides that "[ajll contracts
founded in whole or part on a gambling consideration are void." In
Thornhill v. O'Rear, 108 Ala. 299, 19 So. 382 (1896), our supreme
court observed that a gambling contract involves a wager and, defin-
ing "wager," the court stated:
A wager is nothing more than a bet, 'by which two parties
agree that a certain sum of money, or other thing should
be paid or delivered to one of them on the happening or
not happening of an uncertain event.'
The agreement here was that Harris would pay Wilson a sum of
money upon the happening of an uncertain event over which
neither party had control-Harris's recovery of damages after her
personal injury lawsuit survived the appellate process.3 '
On the other hand, in another recent case, Odell v. Legal Bucks, a
North Carolina court looked to its state statutes concerning gambling
and came to the conclusion that champerty was not gambling. 32
Odell, who had filed a personal injury suit arising from a car accident,
took $4,200 from a commercial litigation funder, Legal Bucks, and
signed a contract that promised to give Legal Bucks a portion of her
award or settlement from the suit if there was an award or settle-
ment.33 The amount that she would give Legal Bucks depended pri-
marily on how much time elapsed between the receipt of the money
by Odell from Legal Bucks, but under the contract, the amount could
not exceed 325% of the advance-no matter how long it took for
Odell to resolve her case.34 In the end, Odell settled her case for
$18,000 and Legal Bucks claimed that she owed them $9,582.35 Odell
refused to pay Legal Bucks more than the statutory interest in North
Carolina, which is 16% per annum.36
29. Id. at 266-68.
30. Id. at 266.
31. Id. at 268 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
32. Odell v. Legal Bucks, L.L.C., 665 S.E.2d 767, 772-73 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).
33. Id. at 770.
34. Id. at 770-71.
35. Id. at 771.
36. Id.
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The court rejected all of Odell's arguments, including the argument
that the contract between her and Legal Bucks was void because it
was an illegal gambling contract.37 The court reasoned that Odell and
Legal Bucks had made neither a "bet" nor a "wager":
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 16-1, in defining illegal gaming contracts, provides:
All wagers, bets or stakes made to depend upon any race,
or upon any gaming by lot or chance, or upon any lot,
chance, casualty or unknown or contingent event
whatever, shall be unlawful; and all contracts, judgments,
conveyances and assurances for and on account of any
money or property, or thing in action, so wagered, bet or
staked, or to repay, or to secure any money, or property,
or thing in action, lent or advanced for the purpose of such
wagering, betting, or staking as aforesaid, shall be void.
... [F]or an agreement to constitute a "bet," there must be both a
winning party and a losing party. In the Agreement at issue in the
current case, however, both Plaintiff and Defendants desired the
same outcome of the uncertain event: that Plaintiff recover a large
sum of money in her personal injury claim. All parties to the
Agreement stood to gain if Plaintiff recovered an amount equal to
or greater than the sum of the principal of the advance plus the
accrued interest. Likewise, all parties to the Agreement stood to
lose if Plaintiff recovered less than the amount she owed to
Defendants....
A "wager," as defined above, requires that neither party to the
wager have any interest in the contingent event at issue. It is true
that Defendants had no independent interest in the outcome of
Plaintiff's personal injury claim. However, it is equally clear that
Plaintiff did have an independent interest in the outcome of her per-
sonal injury claim. The outcome of Plaintiff's personal injury claim
would not only define Plaintiff's legal rights and obligations under
the Agreement with Defendants, but would also define her legal
rights with respect to the other parties to the automobile accident
giving rise to her claim.38
Obviously, one of the problems with evaluating the argument that
champerty is gambling is the possibility of multiple definitions of gam-
bling. The Model Anti-Gambling Act-adopted in 1952 and declared
obsolete in 1984 by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws-reflects the views of the American Bar Associa-
tion Commission on Organized Crime, which are instructive in under-
37. Id. at 773.
38. Id. at 772-73. The court relied upon the definition of "bet" and "wager" found in 38 AM.
JUR. 2n Gambling § 3 (2010) because North Carolina courts had not previously defined these
terms for the purposes of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 16-1.
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standing and interpreting the meaning of some statutory provisions in
various state laws. The Act defines "gambling" as
risking any money, credit, deposit, or other thing of value for gain
contingent in whole or in part upon lot, chance or the operation of a
gambling device, but does not include: bonafide contests of skill,
speed, strength or endurance in which awards are made only to en-
trants or the owners of entries; bonafide business transactions which
are valid under the law of contracts ... 39
The North Carolina definition of a wager presupposes two people
basing a contract on the contingent result of an event in which they
have nothing at stake other than the sum named in the contract. Two
people who wager on a coin tossed by a third-party have nothing at
stake in the outcome of the coin toss other than the wager between
themselves. But this seems like an overly restrictive definition of a
wager. If Bob has applied for a grant from the Ford Foundation, his
wager with Ben over whether he receives the grant is still a wager
even though Bob is very interested not only in winning the wager with
Ben but in getting the grant from the Ford Foundation. Furthermore,
I am not sure that I agree with the North Carolina definition of a bet,
or at least the way that definition was interpreted in the Odell case. I
agree with the court that "for an agreement to constitute a 'bet,' there
must be both a winning party and a losing party." 40 I am not sure why
Odell was not the losing party in her bet with Legal Bucks. The bet
was that if she secured a positive outcome from her lawsuit (anything
greater than $0 net her attorney's fees), she had to pay Legal Bucks
the first $9,582. It is true that that she might have been happy to lose
this bet if the outcome from her suit was greater than $9,582 (net her
attorney's fees) but that seems irrelevant from the fact that whether
she had to pay Legal Bucks at all was contingent on the outcome of
her suit.
Before we examine the consequences of adopting a more relaxed
definition of gambling along the lines of that suggested by either the
Model Anti-Gambling Act or Alabama's state law, it is important to
recognize that champerty could escape any suggestion that it was any
form of gambling if it were to present itself as essentially a form of
investment in the lawsuit of another. The motivation for this defini-
tional move is simple-if the paradigm example of gambling is a con-
tract with another to make the terms of the payoff contingent on
events over which one has no control, then to the extent that both
parties to the contract can stress their control over the outcome, the
39. MoDEL. ANTI-GAMBLING Acr § 2 (1952) (withdrawn 1984).
40. Odell, 665 S.E.2d at 773.
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more likely that the contract will be viewed as an investment rather
than a wager.
Courts allowed this same definitional move when they drew a dis-
tinction between "speculation" and gambling in the late nineteenth
century futures markets. In the early years of the development of the
commodities markets, it was an open question whether the contracts
traded on these exchanges were anything other than gambling con-
tracts. 41 This question was categorically answered in the negative by
Justice Holmes in Board of Trade of Chicago v. Christie Grain &
Stock Co.4 2 As Joshua Tate has pointed out, the road to Justice
Holmes's conclusion was paved by numerous courts drawing finer and
finer distinctions between gambling-which was very much on the
minds of the public authorities at the time-and financial specula-
tion-which was a relatively new activity into which the courts pro-
jected a number of value judgments. 43 For example, Kirkpatrick &
Lyons v. Bonsall involved an 1870 futures contract to sell 5,000 barrels
of oil during the first six months of 1871 at a specified price.44 The
court argued that
[w]e must not confound gambling, whether it be in corporation
stocks or merchandise, with what is commonly termed speculation.
Merchants speculate upon the future prices of that in which they
deal, and buy and sell accordingly. In other words they think of and
weigh, that is speculate upon, the probabilities of the coming market,
and act upon this lookout into the future, in their business transac-
tions; and in this they often exhibit high mental grasp, and great
knowledge of business, and of the affairs of the world.... But when
ventures are made upon the turn of prices alone, with no bona fide
intent to deal in the article, but merely to risk the difference be-
tween the rise and fall of the price at a given time, the case is
changed.... Then the bargain represents not a transfer of property,
but a mere stake or wager upon its future price.45
The court was clearly impressed with the idea that the class of persons
who speculate (as opposed to gamble) were businessmen; the busi-
nessmen had an interest in the market in which they made the contin-
gent contracts, even if they had no intention of actually taking
possession of the things to which the contingent contracts (the fu-
41. See Joshua C. Tate, Gambling, Commodity Speculation, and the "Victorian Compromise,"
19 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 97, 98-99 (2007); see also Edwin W. Patterson, Hedging and Wagering
on Produce Exchanges, 40 YALE L.J. 843 (1931) (explaining the problematic distinction between
hedging and wagering in civil litigation).
42. Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 247-48 (1905).
43. See Tate, supra note 41, at 98.
44. Kirkpatrick & Lyons v. Bonsall, 72 Pa. 155, 156 (1872).
45. Id. at 158 (emphasis added).
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tures) referred. Beyond this, the courts have not made much progress
since the late nineteenth century. As one commentator noted,
The common law has defined "speculation" neither clearly nor uni-
formly. . . . Those courts attempting to define "speculation" have
failed to establish a uniform definition....
Although courts have failed to define "speculation" clearly, they
have distinguished between "speculation" and gambling. While
gambling focuses on abstract chance, courts and commentators con-
sider speculation to be a subset of investment. 46
Suggesting speculation is not gambling when the risk-taker has an
interest in the market or activity in which he or she invests could-if
taken to its extreme-save champerty only by placing it on the horns
of a dilemma. In theory, one option available to someone who would
like to invest in litigation is to take an assignment of the lawsuit. The
history of prohibitions on the assignment of "choses in action" paral-
lels the history of champerty; as we have seen above, it was precisely
out of a fear of champerty that, according to Blackstone, the law pro-
hibited assignment as well. 4 7 Since the nineteenth century, assignment
has been permitted in almost all choses of action except "personal
torts" such as personal injury, some forms of professional malpractice,
and defamation. 48
Consequently, the courts have been ever more vigilant to prevent
lesser forms of assignment by means of "intermeddling" through
champerty-that is, taking over a lawsuit not by becoming the party in
interest but by taking over some, if not all, of the major incidents of
control over the conduct of the lawsuit in addition to a contingent
payment if the lawsuit pays out a positive amount.49 At minimum,
intermeddling means something more than that the maintainer has
made suggestions which the party litigating the case has followed; in
the context of champerty, intermeddling must mean that the investor
has bought the right to make certain decisions about the litigation
from the party bringing the suit along with a share of the contingent
outcome. The degree of control the investor obtained by contract can
extend over a spectrum ranging from relatively minor control (e.g.,
46. Michael T. Johnson, Note, Speculating on the Efficacy of "Speculation": An Analysis of the
Prudent Person's Slipperiest Term of Art in Light of Modern Portfolio Theory, 48 STrAN. L. REV.
419, 427-28 (1996) (quoting BENJAMIN GRAHAM & DAVID L. DonD, SECURrry ANALYSIS:
PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUE 43 (3d ed. 1951) ("'[G]ambling' represents the creation of risks not
previously existing-e.g., race-track betting-whereas 'speculation' applies to the taking of risks
that are implicit in a situation and so must be taken by someone." (alteration in original)).
47. The underlying evil that both assignment and maintenance represented to the common
law is not easy to summarize. See Sebok, supra note 1, §§ II, Ill.
48. See id.
49. See infra text accompanying notes 50-53.
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control over what documents the funder can see) to almost complete
control (e.g., control over selection of counsel or veto power over set-
tlement). At some point, the control assumed by the funder by con-
tract verges on full control over the lawsuit, and full control of the
lawsuit collapses the distinction between maintenance and assign-
ment.50 Once the maintainer assumes full control of the lawsuit, she
really is an assignee and the contract that brought her control of the
lawsuit is properly a contract on assignment-not maintenance.5' Fol-
lowing these objections, several courts also prohibit champerty in or-
der to place restrictions on the intermeddling in legal claims,
particularly when the intermeddler is a stranger.52 In Florida, for ex-
ample, intermeddling means "offering unnecessary and unwanted ad-
vice or services; meddlesome, [especially] in a highhanded or
overbearing way."53
The dilemma is, therefore, that the more disinterested in the suit in
which a champertor invests, the more likely her contingent reward
upon the successful resolution of the suit will be deemed gambling.
The more interested in the suit the champertor becomes (short of tak-
ing an assignment in the suit and replacing the original claimant), the
more likely that a court will find champerty against public policy be-
cause it is a form of impermissible intermeddling.
50. See, for example, State Bar of Michigan, Ethics Opinion RI-321 (June 29, 2000), which
described a litigation funding agreement offered in Michigan by a Nevada-based funder and
contained the following conditions: (1) the funder had the right to order the litigant to replace
the lawyer currently handling the case; (2) the funder had the right to order the litigant to refuse
any settlement; (3) the litigant promised to continue the case "under all circumstances"; and (4)
the funder had the right to inspect any document in the litigant's (or his attorney's) possession
regardless of the effect that the inspection might have on the potential waiver of attorney-client
privilege. The committee offered the opinion that no lawyer could recommend this agreement
to a client because it made the funder "in real terms" a "client" in the case "with a co-equal, if
not superior, decision making role" to the litigant receiving the funding. Id
51. See Am. Optical Co. v. Curtiss, 56 F.R.D. 26, 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (holding that an agree-
ment which limited the litigant's control over whether to sue at all violated Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 17(a), which requires the moving party to be the "real party in interest").
52. See Johnson v. Wright, 682 N.W.2d 671, 678 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004) (noting that because
the loan agreement was dependant on the outcome of the plaintiff's lawsuit, the funder "effec-
tively intermeddled and speculated in [the plaintiffs] litigation and its outcome"); Moffett v.
Commerce Trust Co., 283 S.W.2d 591 (Mo. 1955) (defining maintenance as "an officious inter-
meddling in a suit which in no way belongs to one, by maintaining or assisting either party, with
money or otherwise, to prosecute or defend it" (quoting 10 AM. JUR. 549 (1937))); St. Search
Partners, L.P. v. Ricon Int'l, L.L.C., No. 04C-09-191-PLA, 2006 Del. Super. LEXIS 200, at
*12-13 (Del. Super. Ct. May 12, 2006).
53. Kraft v. Mason, 668 So. 2d 679, 682 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting WISTER'S NEW
WORLD DIcnoNARY 988 (2d col. ed. 1986)).
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III. Is CHAMPERTY INSURANCE?
A. Champerty and the "Insurable Interest" Test
The minimal test for gambling endorsed by Alabama-that when-
ever "'two parties agree that a certain sum of money, or other thing
should be paid or delivered to one of them on the happening or not
happening of an uncertain event'" 54-has the virtue of simplicity. It
focuses on the fortuity of the reward enjoyed by the recipient of the
reward-that is to say, the lack of control of the recipient over
whether the outcome will come about. Of course, this definition itself
fails to fully capture the real world of champerty because the party
taking the funding does have some control over the outcome upon
which the contingent reward depends. Even the plaintiff in Wilson v.
Harris had some control over whether her appeal would succeed, al-
though most of the control she could have exercised would have made
a difference before the funder had "invested" his $4,749. Certainly, in
the typical case of litigation finance such as Odell, the party receiving
the money can make a large difference in the existence and scale of a
contingent recovery.
As Professor Tom Baker has pointed out, the mere fact that one
party can affect the occurrence of a contingent outcome does not
helpfully distinguish gambling from, for example, insurance. In On
the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, Baker observed that the emerging
insurance markets of the nineteenth century developed the distinction
between "physical" hazards and "moral" hazards.55 The former cate-
gory referred to risks inherent in nature and over which the insured
had no control, while the latter referred to "people and situations.
The people were those whose character suggested that they were un-
usually susceptible to the temptation that insurance can create, and
the situations were those that heightened that temptation." 56 As
Baker noted, to the extent that actuarial science could predict the
probability of these people and situations generating a loss as a result
of falling prey to the temptation contained in the moral hazard, the
insurance industry could, in theory, price insurance while taking into
account moral hazards.57 Baker's article chronicled the attempts by
54. Wilson v. Harris, 688 So. 2d 265, 268 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996) (quoting Thornhill v. O'Rear,
19 So. 382, 383 (Ala. 1896)).
55. Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 Tiex. L. REV. 237, 248 (1996).
56. Id. at 250.
57. Id. at 252.
If there were regular, observable patterns "of moral as well as of physical phenom-
ena," and if insurance was to become the practical application of this doctrine of
chances, then why resist collecting premiums from, and paying losses caused by, people
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the insurance industry and observers to use the concept of moral haz-
ard to police the content of insurance policies and the very meaning of
the term insurance:
Despite the similarity between moral and physical hazards, nine-
teenth-century insurers treated moral and physical hazards in one
remarkably different way. Except in the extreme case, the answer to
most physical hazards was a higher premium rate, not a refusal to
msure. ...
With moral hazard, in contrast, refusal to insure was the first re-
sort. Unlike the applicant who presented a greater-than-usual physi-
cal hazard, the applicant who presented a greater-than-usual moral
hazard could not obtain insurance at a higher price.58
Insurance that attempted to underwrite moral hazards was de-
nounced for many reasons. One of the most important reasons, as
Baker and others have noted, is that these policies were seen as a
form of gambling.59 The problem is that the line demarcating gam-
bling and insurance kept moving: at one time even life insurance that
underwrote "natural" hazards was outlawed as gambling. Life insur-
ance was initially viewed as gambling and was prohibited in several
European countries during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 60
To stop such gambling, insurance contracts in which there was no "in-
surable interest" were considered wagers and were unenforceable at
law.6 1 The requirement of an insurable interest lessened and eventu-
ally eliminated resistance to life insurance. 62 By the nineteenth cen-
who ran afoul of the underwriter's or adjuster's moral hazard ranking? After all, if
suicides, weddings, and crime observed the regularities of dice games, why not careless-
ness? Insuring people thought more likely to be careless (or even arsonists or thieves)
may, in effect, load the dice, but that simply changes the odds, not the fact that the dice
will produce predictable results over the long run. All that is required to keep the game
afloat is the collection of a higher premium from the morally hazardous.
Id. (quoting Horace Binney, Address 393 (1950)).
58. Id. at 253.
59. Id. at 257 (citing VIVIANA A. ROTMAN ZELIZER, MORALS AND MARKETS: TiE DEVE7LOP-
MENT OF LIFE INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 72 (1979) on nineteenth-century resistance to
the life insurance industry).
60. See SHEPARD B. CLOUGH, A CENTURY or AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE: A HISTORY OF
TIE MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE7 COMPANY OF NEW YORK, 1843-1943, at 20 (1946); ZEIZER,
supra note 59, at 33.
61.
The roots of the insurable interest doctrine and the origins of modern insurance are
intertwined. A version of the insurable interest doctrine first arose in England in a 1774
statute responding to perceived excesses by early insurers combined with widespread
religious aversion to the concept of gambling on the lives of others.
Michael J. Henke, Corporate-Owned Life Insurance Meets the Texas Insurable Interest Require-
ment: A Train Wreck in Progress, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 51, 54 (2003).
62. Baker, supra note 55, at 257 n.83 ("[T]he passage of the Gambling Act of 1774, which
prohibited wagering policies, 'represented the first attempt to sunder activities that had previ-
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tury, efforts to draw crisp lines between gambling and insurance were
unraveling:
[I]nsurance writers often relied on difficult-to-maintain intent dis-
tinctions (for example, insurers seek protection against losses, gam-
blers seek gains) or subterfuge (for example, equating life insurance
and savings plans). On close analysis, these efforts are not particu-
larly persuasive . . . . Insurance and gambling are not only difficult
to separate historically, they are also difficult to separate analyti-
cally. . . . In the end, the strategy of the insurance men was to sepa-
rate insurance and gambling institutionally: Whatever "gambling"
was, it was not something that "insurance" institutions would do.63
The lesson from the nineteenth century is that the distinction be-
tween insurance and gambling, like the distinction between specula-
tion and gambling, cannot be established by a priori definitions.64 It is
clear that the insurance contracts overlap to some extent with the defi-
nition of wagering set out by the Alabama courts and the Model Anti-
Gambling Act: money is paid on the occasion of an uncertain event.
As one of Baker's nineteenth-century sources argued,
Insurance is, in reality, nothing more than a wager, for the under-
writer who insures at one per cent, receives one dollar to return one
hundred upon the contingency of a certain event; and it is precisely
the same in its operation as if he had bet a wager of ninety-nine
dollars to one that the property does not burn, or that a certain
event does not happen. . . . But, in a moral point of view, it should
be considered entirely different. The character of an act is deter-
mined by its spirit, intention, and consequences. An individual that
insures a bona fide interest, does it with a different intention than he
who obtains a policy upon property in which he has no interest; for
the latter hopes to make a gain, the former to protect himself from
loss . . . .65
ously been carried out in a common domain and to consign them to different operation and
moral spheres."' (quoting Geoffrey Wilson Clark, Betting on Lives: Life Insurance in English
Society and Culture, 1695-1775 (1993) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University))).
63. Id. at 258 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
64. As one commentator has noted,
Probability theory, on which modern insurance was based, had been developed in the
seventeenth century at the behest of professional gamblers, and it had not lost its link
to gambling devices such as dice and lotteries. . . . Life insurance was berated "as a
'speculation repugnant to the law of God and man' that turned life into 'an article of
merchandise"' and through which "man was not only 'betting against his God,' but,
even worse, usurping His divine functions of protection."
Roy Kreitner, Speculations of Contract, or How Contract Law Stopped Worrying and Learned to
Love Risk, 100 COLum. L. Rav. 1096, 1099-00 (2000) (quoting ZEL'IZER, supra note 59, at
45-46).
65. George W. Savage, Origin and Nature of Fire Insurance, 4 Huwr's MERCHANTS' MAG.
159, 160 (1842).
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The distinction between wagers that are "insurance" and other wagers
that might be better described as gambling (or speculation) is func-
tional. As Baker put it, the distinction is based on the motive behind
the wager: "[I]nsurers seek protection against losses, gamblers seek
gains." 66
A "moralized" conception of insurance, if carried forward, does
help explain why champerty is not insurance and might therefore be
classified as gambling or speculation. The moralized definition-
which putatively focuses on the motive of the party making the wa-
ger-really seems to distinguish between insurance and gambling on
the basis that insurance deals with an existing risk while a wager cre-
ates a risk. 67 This definition anchors the wager on the desire of the
insured to preserve her status quo, not to gain from the vagaries of
fortune. The person who takes out fire insurance on her house pre-
sumably prefers her house over the check from the fire insurance
company; her state of affairs ex ante to the fire is her "first best" posi-
tion (house minus the cost of the premium), while her state of affairs
ex post the fire is a marginally "second best" position (cash equivalent
of the house minus the cost of the premium and transaction costs).6 8
The reason that insurers claim to insist on the "insurable interest"
condition in life insurance is an extension of this line of reasoning:
insurance must be in some way connected to the protection of an in-
terest already enjoyed or held by the insured.69 This is what George
Savage, quoted by Baker above, meant when he said that insurance
should only be extended to protect someone against the loss of a
"bona fide interest."70
Many commentators and scholars have complained that the conven-
tional "moralized" definition of insurable interest as bona fide interest
is ad hoc and inconsistent.7' Attempts to provide a purely economic
66. See Baker, supra note 55, at 258.
67. See RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & IAN AYRES, STuoIs IN CONTRAcr LAw 612 (6th ed. 2003)
(claiming that those insured seek insurance "to compensate them for the possible occurrence of
an existing risk" while "[g]amblers by their contracts create the risk at issue").
68. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88 Cotum.
L. REV. 942 (1988).
69. See Baker, supra note 55, at 259 ("[T]he common law 'insurable interest' requirement
(which was one solution to the temptation aspect of the moral hazard problem) declared that
insurance policies sold to people who lacked an 'insurable interest' were voidable 'wagering'
policies.").
70. Savage, supra note 65, at 160.
71. For a review of the centuries of criticism, see Jacob Loshin, Note, Insurance Law's Hapless
Busybody: A Case Against the Insurable Interest Requirement, 117 YALE L.J. 474, 483-89 (2007).
("In both life and property insurance, therefore, the definition of insurable interest is erratic,
ambiguous, and inconsistent.").
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definition of insurable interest are more promising, but have also been
criticized for being empty.72 I will not hazard entering this debate,
except to say that, to the extent that a "bona fide" interest includes
any "economic interest in the safety or preservation of property from
loss, destruction or pecuniary damage," then I would argue that the
champerty contract can be seen as an insurance contract.73
What is the "insurable interest" in a champerty contract? At first
glance, it might seem as if the "investor" in a lawsuit is the opposite of
a party seeking insurance. She is a stranger to the lawsuit and has
nothing at stake unless she chooses to make the wager. But, as
Jonathan Molot has pointed out (albeit in a different context), litiga-
tion investment can serve as a form of insurance.74 In Molot's model,
a firm that faces a litigation risk (e.g., a liability) would ideally have
liability insurance that protected it from the cost of liability ("before
the event" insurance, or BTE). However, what if the firm did not
have BTE insurance or its BTE insurance was inadequate? In theory,
it could purchase "after the event" (ATE) liability insurance by as-
signing its potential liability to another party at a price that reflected a
discount to the expected cost of the liability.75 Much of Molot's article
tries to explain how a market in ATE liability insurance could de-
velop, the details of which are not relevant to this Article. 76
I would like to suggest that the much more common form of cham-
perty, which already exists in the United States and United Kingdom
markets, is also a form of insurance. Under the conventional plaintiff-
side champerty contract, a party who has filed a lawsuit which has not
yet been reduced to judgment "sells" a portion of that contingent re-
turn to the champertor. One way of viewing the litigant's interest in
the lawsuit is that it concerns (in Baker's words) a potential gain, or
the recovery of damages from the defendant. But the plaintiff in a
72. See SPEIDEL & AYREs, supra note 67, at 612; see also Thomas Lee Hazen, Disparate Regu-
latory Schemes for Parallel Activities: Securities Regulation, Derivatives Regulation, Gambling,
and Insurance, 24 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 375, 422 (2005).
Professors Speidel and Ayres, among others, attempt to distinguish between insurance
and gambling on the basis that insurance deals with an existing risk while a wager cre-
ates a risk. This does not appear to be a satisfactory distinction. The wager simply adds
economic consequences for the parties to the wager, much as a derivatives contract on
the price of a commodity provides a parallel economic consequence for the speculator.
Id. (footnote omitted).
73. N.Y. INS. LAw § 3401 (McKinney 2007); see also, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE §§ 280-384 (West
2005).
74. See Molot, supra note 17, at 367.
75. See id. at 377.
76. See id. at 378-90. The most daunting questions are whether the insurer can (1) price the
risk and (2) achieve any discount to the expected cost of the liability by taking on the risk from
the firm. See id.
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lawsuit is not seeking to realize a gain; she is trying to repair a loss. If
this is correct, then we can see her lawsuit as a risk that is symmetrical
to the risk of liability faced by the opponent she is suing. Under this
analysis, the focus should not be on the champertor (the investor) but
on the rightholder who sells part of her suit to the investor. The right
way of seeing "champerty as insurance" is to see that the champerty
contract permits the rightholder to purchase a very special kind of
insurance. I will try to illustrate what I mean in the following
paragraph.
Before the accident that gave rise to the suit into which the cham-
pertor invested, the litigant (L) was uninjured. Assume L had a wel-
fare of 100 before the accident. After the accident that gave rise to her
injury, her welfare was decreased by some amount; in this example, let
us assume the amount of the decrease is 20. Upon deciding to sue the
person whom she reasonably believes wrongfully injured her, L's wel-
fare is now 80 plus the expected value of her suit. The expected value
of her suit is less than 20 (unless punitive damages and legal expenses
are awarded), so her welfare after the accident and before the resolu-
tion of her suit is 80 + (20p - F) where p is the probability of recover-
ing her wrongful losses and F is the amount of any legal fees L will
have to pay in order to recover her wrongful losses. Assuming that L
has a non-frivolous lawsuit worth 20, she faces a risk of no recovery
and a risk of less than full recovery. In the same way that an investor
could remove the risk of a future liability from a defendant by
"purchasing" that risk, an investor could remove the risk that L will
receive no compensation for her wrongful loss by "purchasing" that
risk from her. Therefore, the champerty contract is an "arrangement
for transferring and distributing risk" where the risk is the failure of
the legal system to provide in part (or in whole) the redress of wrong-
ful losses.7 7 It is a form of insurance.
B. Champerty and Moral Hazard
As many commentators have noted, the scholastic debate over the
concept of an insurable interest is often overwhelmed by the more
practical problem of minimizing the risk of moral hazard wrecking the
insurance market.78 The moral hazard concern of insurance is that an
insured will be overly insured and will therefore be able to profit from
an event, thereby either choosing to bring that event about or taking
77. Keeton's classic definition of insurance is an "arrangement for transferring and distribut-
ing risks." ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDiss, INSURANCE LAW: A GuiDE TO FUNDAMEN-
rAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DoCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICizs 3 (student ed. 1988).
78. See Loshin, supra note 71, at 478-79 n.10 (collecting sources).
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less than socially efficient steps to protect against that event's occur-
rence.79 Professor Catherine Sharkey has noted, both in her article
and in commentary on this Article, that the conceptual problem of
fitting champerty into insurance might be usefully analyzed by adopt-
ing a functional approach which asks to what extent the shifting of the
plaintiff's risk of receiving "no redress" after an accident might pro-
duce a moral hazard.80
Sharkey's observation is helpful, and in this context, we can usefully
contrast champerty contracts with insurance contracts for punitive
damages. Sharkey noted that there may have been credible reasons
for courts and insurance companies to resist the insurability of puni-
tive damages, citing George Priest's classic 1988 article for that pro-
position.81 It is worth noting, albeit for different reasons, that courts
in the nineteenth century had strong intuitions against permitting in-
surance for punitive damages in ways which are similar to social resis-
tance to champerty contracts. 82 But as Sharkey argued, by adopting
Priest's own account of what can count as an insurable interest, an
argument could be made that punitive damages as they have now de-
veloped should be insurable:
Simply stated, two related conditions must be met in order for a risk
to be insurable. First, the losses must be probabilistic: "A loss that is
certain to occur in some particular period cannot be insured against;
one can only accumulate savings before the loss occurs or after the
loss is suffered to restore the previous economic position." Second,
the ever-present problem of moral hazard must be restrained.
Moral hazard describes the behavioral effects of insurance on the
insured; thereby, if insurance lowers expected injury costs, the in-
sured will proceed with risky activities, increasing the likelihood of
injuries to others.83
Sharkey's argument with regard to punitive damages is that-to the
extent that they are now awarded to prevent under-deterrence involv-
ing cases of non-intentional wrongdoing-there is no reason to allow
insurance companies to categorically disclaim their obligation to stand
79. See DeCespedes v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co., 193 So. 2d 224, 226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966)
("The insured must not be encouraged to use the coverage for profit as this intends to increase
moral hazard and could ultimately undermine the whole concept of insurance."); Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co. v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 277 A.2d 603, 608 (Md. 1971) (describing insurance clauses
as designed to protect insurers from moral hazard resulting from overinsurance); Baker, supra
note 55, at 259; Loshin, supra note 71, at 488.
80. See Catherine M. Sharkey, Revisiting the Noninsurable Costs of Accidents, 64 Mo. L. REv.
409 (2005).
81. Id. at 434-35 (citing George L. Priest, Insurability and Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REV.
1009 (1989)).
82. See id. at 420.
83. Id. at 434-35 (quoting Priest, supra note 81, at 1020 (footnotes omitted)).
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behind their insureds when their insureds are found liable for punitive
damages: "[R]isks of losses leading to punitive damages awards have
become more probabilistic and less subject to insured moral
hazard. "84
Under the same general analysis, it would appear that champerty
contracts should be permitted as insurance as well. Both of Priest's
conditions are satisfied under these contracts. First, the loss is proba-
bilistic: for someone seeking redress for a wrong that was done to her,
the chance of recovery is never 1.0, but always a factor less than
zero.85 Second, the ever-present problem of moral hazard is re-
strained. This is because champerty is not assignment. Because the
rightholder is not assigning the entirety of her claim but only a por-
tion, she still has an interest in the outcome of the suit, and therefore
she is not indifferent after she sells a portion of her suit between the
result for which she bought "insurance" (the lawsuit being won) and
the alternative result (losing the lawsuit). That would not be the case
had she assigned the lawsuit, but-although the law has not always
been clear on this point-champerty is clearly not the same thing as
assignment.8 6 There are other reasons besides financial self-interest
for why the rightholder who sells to a champertor would prefer to
avoid the risk against which she insured (the non-redress of her injury
by the person who violated her right) such as the rightholder's natural
desire for satisfaction; however, the material incentive alone should
satisfy concerns over moral hazard.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this short Article, I have attempted to analyze one common criti-
cism of champerty: that it is a form of gambling. This line of attack is
not persuasive not because champerty may not satisfy the definition of
wagering, but because, as I have argued, the fact that a contract condi-
tions the award of money on the occurrence of an uncertain event tells
us nothing about whether, as a functional matter, the contract serves a
socially useful function. I have argued further that champerty can be
seen as a form of "after the event" insurance for victims of wrongful
losses. The next step in this analysis would be to compare the form
84. Id. at 437.
85. Courts sometimes make the mistake of assuming that pending litigation is a "sure thing"
and therefore conclude that champertous contracts should be reclassified as loans. See, e.g.,
Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., No. 20523, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 4818, at *8
(Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2001), aff'd on other grounds, 789 N.E.2d 217 (Ohio 2003). No case is a
"sure thing" until reduced to judgment for numerous reasons, and even then the certainty of
redress depends on the rightholder's ability to collect on the judgment.
86. See Sebok, supra note 1, (manuscript at 37).
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and content of champertous investments with another well-developed
market in "after the event" insurance in litigation: insurance for legal
fees in the United Kingdom. 87
87. See Willem H. van Boom, Juxtaposing BTE and A TE: The Role of the European Insurance
Industry in Funding Civil Litigation, OxFORD U. Comp. L.F. (Mar. 26, 2010), http://oucif.ius-
comp.orglarticles/vanboom.shtmi.
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